Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivers a speech in Tehran, Iran, on January 9. The current Iran protests are distinguished not only by a change in the U.S. response, but the markedly weakened condition of the Iranian state. Photo by Iranian Leader’s Press Office/UPI. | License Photo
As mass protests spread across Iran once again, skepticism is natural. Observers may reasonably ask whether this is merely another cycle of unrest destined to fade, as previous uprisings have. Yet viewing the current moment solely through the lens of repetition risks overlooking a fundamental shift in the geopolitical environment. What distinguishes this episode is not only a qualitative change in the U.S. response, but the markedly weakened condition of the Iranian state itself. Washington appears to have recognized this dual reality — a more assertive citizenry confronting a system under strain — and is calibrating its approach accordingly, through what can be described as a strategy of “coercive deterrence.”
To understand this shift, it is useful to contrast the present situation with the historical record. During the major crackdowns of 2009, 2019 and 2022, the Islamic Republic maintained the outward appearance of institutional cohesion. The security services functioned with relative unity, the clerical establishment projected consensus, and the economy, though under pressure, remained operational enough to sustain repression. In those moments, U.S. policy largely framed protesters as a population at risk, rather than as a political force capable of precipitating systemic change.
A regime under strain
That projection of resilience has since eroded. Today, the Islamic Republic faces a convergence of internal pressures that collectively weaken its capacity to respond decisively.
Politically, the clerical establishment is increasingly fragmented. With persistent questions surrounding Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s health and succession, elite competition has intensified behind the scenes. The absence of a clear and uncontested successor has reduced the regime’s ability to impose discipline across its power centers at a moment of heightened internal stress.
Militarily, signs of institutional friction have become harder to dismiss. Analysts and regional security assessments point to growing tension between the ideologically driven Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the more professional regular army, or Artesh. While neither force has openly defected, this lack of seamless coordination raises uncertainty over how reliably the coercive apparatus would function in the event of a nationwide, high-intensity crackdown.
Externally, sustained sanctions pressure, coupled with intelligence setbacks and an ongoing shadow conflict with Israel, has further strained the system. These pressures have not merely reduced living standards; they have chipped away at the regime’s aura of control. The Islamic Republic is not simply unpopular — its governing capacity appears more constrained than at any point since its founding in 1979.
A broader social convergence
At the same time, the internal dynamics of dissent have evolved. Unlike earlier episodes of unrest that were often segmented by class, region or ethnicity, the current protests display a wider degree of convergence. Demonstrations have drawn participation across social strata and geographic lines, linking grievances from Tehran’s commercial centers to peripheral provinces and minority regions.
This convergence should not be overstated as a fully unified political movement with a single leadership or program. However, it does suggest a narrowing gap between disparate social groups that once protested in isolation. What has emerged is less a coordinated opposition than a shared rejection of the regime’s legitimacy — a shift with significant implications for state stability.
Rhetoric as strategy
These parallel developments — a more fragmented state and a more broadly mobilized society — have altered Washington’s strategic calculus. Recent statements by President Donald Trump and senior U.S. officials increasingly frame the situation not as a crisis to be directly managed by external actors, but as a process whose outcome must ultimately be determined by Iranians themselves.
Notably, U.S. officials have consistently avoided the explicit language of “regime change,” instead emphasizing that “the Iranian people must decide their future.” This rhetorical restraint is not incidental. By foregrounding Iranian agency, Washington limits the regime’s ability to discredit the protests as a foreign-backed operation — a familiar tactic used to justify repression in the past.
The military paradox of coercive deterrence
The most controversial aspect of this posture lies in its military signaling. The deployment of U.S. carrier strike groups to the region and warnings that Washington would respond forcefully to large-scale violence against civilians have prompted concerns that the United States is laying the groundwork for war. Interpreted in isolation, such moves could support that reading.
Viewed through the lens of coercive deterrence, however, their function appears more restrictive than preparatory. The objective is not to initiate conflict, but to constrain the regime’s available choices by credibly signaling the costs of indiscriminate repression. For protesters, this posture offers a measure of deterrence against mass violence. For a leadership already under strain, it serves as a reminder that certain actions could accelerate, rather than contain, instability.
This approach carries inherent risks. External pressure can provoke nationalist backlash, and deterrence can fail if misread or deliberately tested. Yet it also reflects a calculation that the greater danger lies in allowing unchecked violence to restore a brittle form of control.
Conclusion
The logic behind this strategy — intervention without direct intervention — is rooted in hard-earned experience. Political outcomes imposed through external force have repeatedly proven fragile. By contrast, transitions driven by internal pressure, however uncertain, carry greater legitimacy and durability.
The United States appears to be attempting a narrow and precarious balancing act: using military leverage to limit the regime’s capacity for mass repression, while leaving the direction and timing of political change to Iranian society itself. Whether this approach succeeds remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that the configuration of forces inside Iran today — a strained state confronting a broader, more synchronized public challenge — differs in meaningful ways from the past. In that sense, this time truly is different.
